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Abstract: With the large-scale migration to computer-based and network technology, the threat of unauthorized remote access 
to railway command and control systems does not appear to be something extraordinary.But external effects shall be considered 
alongside with internal factorsof signalling software and hardware such errors and undocumented features. Risk mitigation in 
terms of cybersecurity of signalling installations can onlybe achieved as a combination of means designed within some holistic 
approach integrating both safety and IT security aspects.
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INTRODUCTION  
Railways are generally considered as critical in-
frastructure. This means that failures and incidents 
can ultimately cause national-level disruptions.They 
could also have a dramatic effect on the safety of the 
public, business performance and reputation.
Year to year, the number, sophistication and diver-
sity of registered cyberattacks are steadily growing. 
Attackers use a variety of tactics; they have different 
motivations – from ϐinancial beneϐits to revenge.
In 2016, the UK’s railway system was affected by 
at least four major cyber attacks, while in 2017 the 
WannaCry virus caused the failure of the PIS/PAS 
system of a German railway carrier and affected oth-
er railways.In 2018aDDoS attack at Danske Statsba-
ner, the biggest Danish train operator, halted trains 
operations and blocked passenger services.
What is more important is that cyber attacks can 
also cause wrong-side failures within the command 
and control system. And that could mean severe 
harm to assets, environment and people. Nowadays 
“malicious cyber activity” is becoming more of a 
safety concern for digitalized railway command and 
control systems rather than just a security concern.
The range of potential consequences of cyber 
security incidents related to railway command and 
control is wide and includes:
• Loss of system availability
• Degradation of system performance
• Manipulation or loss of data
• Loss of production control
• Environmental disaster
• Risk of death and grave injury
• Damage to company image
• Financial loss [1].
CYBERSECURITY THREATS AND RAILWAY COMMAND AND 
CONTROL
Until recently, it was generally believed that rail-
way signalling systems,being isolated from external 
effects, are immune to any cybersecurity threats and 
attacks. That is no longer the case. Now, the focus is 
on providing resilience, rather than preserving im-
munity.
The potential scenarios of cyber attacks against 
safety critical systems are many. They include unau-
thorized access to equipment, tampering with hard-
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ware and software and more. But unlike non-critical 
IT systems, their aim does not consist in the breach 
of conϐidentiality.The motivation can include com-
promising the system safety and manipulating criti-
cal commands and controls in order to cause train 
collisions, unexpected train stops, power cuts etc. 
That, for instance, can be achieved by clearing the 
signal that should not be cleared, releasing the track 
section that should be blocked, etc. 
Even a simple USB ϐlash drive can be used to com-
promise the functional safety of a critical signalling 
installation. Social engineering (man in the middle) 
is a very important factor here. A lot depends on 
the company’s cybersecurity policy and personnel 
training, monitoring of staff behavior and motiva-
tion assessment.
The vulnerability of signalling installations has 
been shown by various projects and by in-house 
hackers. The vulnerability of the ERTMS system was 
demonstrated in the SECRET (Security of Railways 
against Electromagnetic Attacks) project. The proj-
ect focused on assessing the risks and consequences 
of electromagnetic attacks on the rail infrastructure 
and developing protection solutions. Such critical 
data channels as GSM-R and balises were identiϐied 
as the most probable “targets”. The possibility of ef-
fective suppression of these communication chan-
nels with the low-priced «jammers» was experi-
mentally conϐirmed [2]. 
The railway system includes a number of layers 
and interfaces to external systems. Therefore, we 
must take into account and map all possible threats, 
techniques and devices that could target each zone 
and conduit of signalling installations.
From the perspective of safety-critical signalling 
installations’ operators, it is not the issue of conϐi-
dentiality, integrity and availability of information 
in general, rather than the issue how to be protected 
Figure 1. Railway command and control levels and cyber threats
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against malicious code in the software and undocu-
mented features of the signalling system, to prevent 
open access to safety-critical installations, to iden-
tify and eradicate vulnerabilities etc.
Below are some examples of software and net-
work vulnerabilities and threats [3].
With all these threats in mind, we need to face 
the current and emerging challenges of cybersecu-
rity of railway systems and to understand the risks 
and their possible impact. It means that we have to 
carefully study all the historical cases of cybersecu-
rity incidents, their consequences and who was be-
Vulnerabilities Source of threat Examples of threats
Company data transmission network level
Software vulnerabilities Outside intruder • Execution of a malicious code on a 
gateway computer
• Denial of service
• Remote application launch
• «Password attack»
Vulnerabilities of network protocols 
and communication channels
Outside intruder • Network scanning
• Substitution of the entrusted object
• Network traffi c analysis
• Denial of service
Information support level
Software vulnerabilities Outside intruder • Execution of a malicious code at 
workplaces 
• Denial of service
• Remote application launch
• «Password attack»
Vulnerabilities of network protocols 
and communication channels
Outside intruder • Network scanning
• Substitution of the entrusted object
• Network traffi c analysis
• Denial of service
Information logic processing level
Software vulnerabilities Insider • Execution of a malicious code on an 
industrial control computer
• Denial of service
• Wrong route setting
• Network scanning
• Substitution of the entrusted object
Vulnerabilities of network protocols 
and communication channels
Insider • Network scanning
• Wrong signal setting
• Substitution of the entrusted object
• Network traffi c analysis
• Denial of service
Input/output interface and actuators levels
Vulnerabilities of network protocols 
and communication channels
Outside intruder
or insider
• Substitution of the entrusted object
• Decoy object embedding
• Network scanning
• Network traffi c analysis
• Denial of service
Figure 2. Railway system assessment and evaluation cycle
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hind and how they deployed them. That must be fol-
lowed by a thorough risk assessment and an inven-
tory of vulnerabilities and threats, and those have 
to be updated at every stage of a system’s life cycle 
starting from the design stage. So, it’s like a V model 
with review and revision at each stage. 
Assessment and audit of a railway system’s soft-
ware includes detection and identiϐication of undoc-
umented features which are not intended for use by 
end users, but left available for use by the vendor for 
software support and development.
The problem, though, is that if hackers discover 
such undocumented features, they can also remote-
ly access the device and possibly take control of the 
entire system. This is why all types of undocument-
ed features present potential security and cyber se-
curity risks. 
 - Unintended undocumented features could be 
the result of developer errors, 
 - Intentional undocumented features could be 
deliberately introduced in the software dur-
ing its development. Intentional undocument-
ed features include design, algorithmic and 
malicious logics. 
SECURITY AND SAFETY OF RAILWAY CRITICAL SYSTEMS
In railway control systems that make use of to-
day’s networking technologies, cyber security is the 
continuation of technical (functional) safety and 
must be taken into consideration in the system life-
cycle the same way as the technical safety. As one 
of the fundamental principles of the dependability 
theory postulates, there is no absolute safety. The 
only option isto take measures to minimize the pos-
sible risk, a procedure that leaves the residual risk. 
And as we know, risk is a combination of the rate 
(probability) of an event and the gravity of its con-
sequences.
For a railway operator, the basic task consists in 
deϐining the justiϐied acceptable level of residual risk 
subject to the available funds and other means of 
reducing the risk at the company’s disposal. A com-
prehensive approach to safety management based 
on the risk assessment allows examining the aspects 
of technical safety and cyber security as a whole. A 
widely used tool is the risk matrix that allows clas-
sifying the existing risks based on their probability 
and possible damage (see the Figure below). The 
risks classiϐied as intolerable must be eliminated at 
the design stage. For tolerable risks, damage reduc-
tion measures are to be developed [4].
System safety and system security are closely 
related to each other in terms of the availability of 
authorized functions. The safety and security of a 
system in general mean that a system does what it 
is supposed to do and does not do what it is not sup-
posed to do.
However, while the tolerable hazard rate(THR) of 
functional safety is in fact a mathematical probabil-
ity, the security level cannot be based on the prob-
Figure 3. Software assesment and evaluation
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ability principle since there is an intentional action 
by an attacker or a group of attackers.
There are still other conϐlicts between safety and 
security requirements and approaches. For exam-
ple, safety requirements may overrule security re-
quirements: security requires complex and unique 
passwords to login, safety requires short term login 
to avoid critical loss of time in stressful situation. 
The great number of international conferences 
dedicated to the cyber security of railway systems 
held over the past few years demonstrates the grow-
ing awareness of the existing cyber threats. Railway 
companies have accumulated some experience in 
correlating cyber threats with types of technical 
failures, conducting penetration tests and identify-
ing the vulnerabilities of existing systems. However, 
these activities are performed in a situation when 
there is no common international railway cyber 
security standard and no standardized procedures 
and methodology. 
CYBERSECURITY AS A MULTI-LAYERED APPROACH
Various research projects aim to cover the exist-
ing lack of a common safety/security standard. 
For example, the European project CYRail (Cy-
bersecurity in the railway sector) deϐined a num-
ber of recommendations for the development of a 
structured cybersecurity strategy for the railway 
industry with some emphasis on the identiϐication 
of most critical railway services, zones and conduits, 
and deϐinition of detection and mitigation strate-
gies. As a basis the project uses a series of IEC 62443 
standards intended for industrial automated control 
systems. The standards are considered by many ex-
perts as a guideline for building a cyber security 
management system. The project also uses these 
standards to develop requirements for a secure-by-
design railway system [5].
In IEC 62443 security levels (SLs) are parts of 
the qualitative approach to addressing security for 
a zone.
SL0 – no special protection requirements 
SL1 – protection against casual or coincidental 
violation 
SL2 – protection against intentional violation us-
ing simple means with low resources, generic skill 
and motivation 
SL3 – protection against intentional violation us-
ing sophisticated means with moderate resources, 
system speciϐic skills and moderate motivation 
SL4 – protection against intentional violation us-
ing sophisticated means with extended resources, 
system speciϐic skills and high motivation.
Research and practice produces a long list of rec-
ommended measures to be used as part of a cyber-
security strategy. Among other things, they include 
regular updating of critical signalling systems soft-
ware, as well as application of trusted software and 
hardware. 
Naturally, a secure-by-design system could be one 
of the options. In particular, a cybersecurity system 
should have a number of independent inbuilt secu-
rity mechanisms to ensure sufϐicient protection in 
case of failure or compromise of any of them.Apart 
from the inbuilt security mechanisms, of utmost im-
portance is the availability of tools for early attack 
detection, suspicious activity monitoring within 
hosts and networks. Though such features can only 
be regarded as complimentary to the inbuilt mecha-
nisms and security procedures.
The UIC ARGUS (Security & Safety Analysis for 
Electric and Computerized Signalling Systems) 
project addressed the safety and security issues of 
computerized railway signaling systems. The proj-
ect aimed at identifying vulnerabilities of signaling 
systems from the perspective of cyber threats and 
developing counteraction methods. The project also 
considered human factor management during the 
life cycle of the system.
The results of UIC ARGUS project as well as the 
activities of the UIC Cybersecurity Platform laid the 
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foundation for the development of a comprehensive 
standardized approach to the issue of safety and se-
curity, like UIC Guidelines for Cyber-Security in Rail-
way issued in 2018. 
The Guidelines have some particular focus on 
railway signalling and telecommunication and de-
scribe how to evaluate the security needs through 
ISO 27001 and using best practices applied in oth-
ers industries, with company’s Information Security 
Management System taken into account. In some 
way the Guidelines provide recommendations about 
how to develop a Security Management System for 
the railway cyber security that should present “a 
systematic approach aiming at establishing, operat-
ing, monitoring, auditing, updating and improving 
the railway cyber security in order to achieve the 
organization’s objectives”. It shall be based on risk 
management and on the implementation of solu-
tions designed to protect the railway assets.
As to the UIC Guidelines for Cyber-Security in 
Railway, a multi-layered approach should be used 
meaning that “for every threat, several protection 
barriers should exist. These should be established 
in such a way that, to overcome them, a potential 
intruder would need professional skills in several 
unrelated areas”.
According to the UIC philosophy, evaluating SL in 
close relation to SIL as part of the comprehensive, 
holistic approach to safety-security of signalling in-
stallations, infrastructure manager (IM) should ap-
ply some well-structured strategy incorporating the 
following fundamental components:
 - Conscious and well-grounded selection of a 
governing principle (modus operandi) ofthe 
company in terms of acceptable risk level
 - Identiϐication of threats and their conse-
quences (threat scenarios)
 - Treatment of threats and their consequences 
at the system level
 - Formalized safety and security requirements 
(with identiϐication of 4 SIL/SL levels) im-
posed on suppliers
 - Well-substantiated choice of system design 
and mitigation measures.  
Cyber security is intertwined with all the busi-
ness issues from service availability to safety. Nowa-
days, all systems rely on their computer and com-
munications systems for all operational purposes 
including availability and safety. Moreover, they also 
rely on the integrity of the data itself.
So, cyber security issues should be treated as 
integral part of the IM’s asset management system. 
Cyber security must be considered in the complete 
scope of railway exploitation and operations (net-
work security, deployment security, signalling se-
curity) and atall stages of development (design, ar-
chitecture, etc.), assessment and audit. Existing in-
ternational standards traditionally treat safety and 
security issues from the point of requirements for 
railway systems suppliers. However, it is usually in-
frastructure managing companies who are ultimate-
ly in charge of security of railway transportation 
and the lives of passengers, while outside threats 
are rapidly growing. IMshave two options – either to 
just rely on suppliers, or to incorporate in their as-
set management system some measures and meth-
ods how to protect their safety-critical installations 
against cyber threats using a cycle of assessment 
and evaluation iterations based on a railway-speciϐic 
methodology.
CONCLUSION
Currently there is no common international stan-
dard for safety and security. Railway operators have 
to take care of security of their signalling installa-
tions on their own. They develop management sys-
tems to identify and eliminate existing vulnerabili-
ties, establish cybersecurity teams and units and 
elaborate internal regulatory provisions.
In a number of countries, national railway au-
thorities and companies have been gaining experi-
ence and best practice in terms of security threat 
mapping and specifying security requirements as 
part of tendering procedures. Though one problem 
is still there – a cybersecurity expert in the railway 
signalling domain isnot an easy target for a market 
headhunter.The industry deϐinitely needs a robust 
cybersecurity strategy that would include training 
of a new kind of experts equally well-versed in both 
signalling systems engineering and information 
technology.
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